Environmental Taxes and the Double-Dividend Hypothesis: Did You Really Expect Something for Nothing by Fullerton, Don & Metcalf, Gilbert E.
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 73
Issue 1 Symposium on Second-Best Theory and Law &
Economics
Article 6
December 1997
Environmental Taxes and the Double-Dividend
Hypothesis: Did You Really Expect Something for
Nothing
Don Fullerton
Gilbert E. Metcalf
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Environmental Taxes and the Double-Dividend Hypothesis: Did You Really Expect Something for
Nothing, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 221 (1998).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol73/iss1/6
ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES AND THE DOUBLE-DIVIDEND
HYPOTHESIS: DID YOU REALLY EXPECT
SOMETHING FOR NOTHING?*
DON FULLERTON** AND GILBERT E. METCALF***
INTRODUCTION
Generally speaking, the "double-dividend hypothesis" suggests
that increased taxes on polluting activities can provide two kinds of
benefits. The first dividend is an improvement in the environment,
and the second dividend is an improvement in economic efficiency
from the use of environmental tax revenues to reduce other taxes such
as income taxes that distort labor supply and saving decisions. These
income tax distortions reduce the efficiency of the market economy,
as estimates suggest that an additional dollar of revenue from the in-
come tax imposes a burden on the private sector of about $1.35. The
35-cent difference is an "excess burden." In contrast, a tax on pollu-
tion can increase the efficiency of the private sector by making the
producer face the full social costs of each polluting activity. Thus, the
second dividend is a reduction in excess burden.
To many, this proposition seems obvious. The policy debate has
focused on specific pollutants that could readily be taxed, and specific
taxes with high excess burden that could readily be reduced. Yet the
academic debate has focused on the general validity of such a proposi-
tion. As described below, several important papers have shown that
the environmental tax has its own distorting effects on labor supply
and therefore can have the same excess burden as a tax on labor in-
come. Thus, the double-dividend hypothesis is said to fail.
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In this paper, we make four main points. First, the validity of the
double-dividend hypothesis cannot logically be settled as a general
matter. Clearly, under some conditions, a particular reform might be
able to improve the environment and improve the tax system by re-
ducing some particularly egregious existing tax. Equally clear is that
some other misguided reforms would not. Each proposal must be
evaluated individually. The important point is that this evaluation
must fully specify the policies already in place as well as the reform
under consideration. If this polluting activity is already taxed at a rate
higher than the "optimal" rate, taking all considerations into account,
then any suggested increase is not warranted. Even if it is taxed at a
low rate, or not at all, the polluting activity might already be subject to
other regulatory restrictions. Existing policies are crucial to under-
standing the benefits of any proposed reform. Moreover, the reform
itself needs to be fully specified: Is this tax added on top of existing
regulatory restrictions, or does it replace those restrictions? And how
will the revenue be used? In this regard, an important contribution of
the double-dividend debate is that the proposal to add an environ-
mental tax is only half of a proposal, because the reform must also
specify whether the revenue goes to deficit reduction, a specific spend-
ing program, or a specific tax reduction.
Therefore, when we review some of the early and recent litera-
ture pertaining to the double-dividend hypothesis, we organize the
discussion around two questions: What are the existing policies in
place before the reform? And what exactly is the reform? Some of
the papers do not address both of these questions, which leaves the
double-dividend hypothesis inadequately specified. Then, without a
well-articulated proposition, they proceed to argue its validity.
Strictly speaking, the second dividend from an environmental tax
reform is a reduction in excess burden from the entire tax system. As
we show below, however, much of the literature has emphasized the
importance of raising revenue in order to obtain this second dividend.
Our second main point is that this focus on revenue is misplaced. A
well-designed reform may generate environmental benefits, and it
may reduce other existing distortions, but those outcomes are entirely
unrelated to whether it raises revenue. We describe a non-revenue-
raising type of command-and-control regulation that has identical eco-
nomic effects to the combination of an environmental tax increase and
income tax reduction. We also describe a revenue-losing environmen-
tal subsidy (financed by an increase in the income tax) that has identi-
cal economic effects to a revenue-raising environmental tax (with
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revenue used to reduce the income tax). If designed to affect behav-
ior in the same way, all three have identical economic effects. The
choice among these three policies then depends on considerations
other than revenue, such as which policy is easier to administer, easier
to enforce, or easier to enact.
To make clear that revenue-raising cannot be the key to eco-
nomic benefits, consider how the revenue is generated. That money
must come from somewhere and impose costs on somebody. It is not
free money. The impact of the reform depends on the extent to which
polluting activities are discouraged and to which productive market
activities are encouraged. Thus the impact of the reform depends on
how it affects relative prices and incentives to work, produce, and
pollute.
Our third main point relates the double-dividend literature to an-
other earlier literature discussing how some types of environmental
policies generate "scarcity rents" by restricting the amount of pollu-
tion. To at least some extent, a restriction on the amount of pollution
is a restriction on the amount of output, which enables firms in equi-
librium to charge a higher price for their output. Given this higher
price of output, the right to pollute is more valuable. The "scarcity
rent" is the increase in the value of the right to pollute one unit. It is
reflected, for example, in the price of a tradeable permit for one ton of
sulfur-dioxide emissions under the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990. These permits are sold on the Chicago Board of Trade for about
$150 each. Other command-and-control restrictions create similar
scarcity rents, even if pollution rights are not tradeable. Consider the
simple case where the production technology requires a fixed amount
of pollution per unit of output, and where the government requires
every firm to cut pollution to 90% of last year's level. Then firms
must cut production to 90% of last year's level. The price of output
must rise, for the market to clear, but actual per-unit production costs
have not changed. Normally firms are prohibited from entering into
agreements that restrict output, but this kind of regulation essentially
requires them to restrict output. The result is super-normal profits.
The point is that environmental protection can raise the price of
output for two very different reasons. First, prices may rise because of
the necessary costs of environmental technologies such as switching to
the more-expensive low-sulfur fuel, switching output to the more-ex-
pensive plant with lower emission rates, or installing flue-gas desulfur-
ization units (scrubbers). These costs can be minimized by well-
designed policies, but they must ultimately offset some of the benefits
19981
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
of environmental improvement. Second, output prices may rise fur-
ther to cover scarcity rents. We argue that this second type of cost is
not essential to environmental protection. Scarcity rents raise the cost
of output unnecessarily, which offsets more of the benefits of environ-
mental improvements. These costs may exceed the benefits of envi-
ronmental improvements, which would turn the whole reform into a
net losing proposition. This point is formalized below.
Moreover, this point about scarcity rents helps explain what was
missing in the debate about the double-dividend hypothesis. When a
tax on pollution raises revenue, we argue that the government is
merely capturing the scarcity rent associated with restricting that pol-
lutant. In a sense, the tax raises the cost of production by more than
the minimum necessary. It requires the firm not only to install scrub-
bers or undertake other expensive pollution abatement, but also to
pay the tax. The revenue is the scarcity rent. The difference is that
the government can use those revenues to offset the increased costs of
production by reducing other existing taxes on production. This point
can be clarified by comparing the handout of tradeable permits, as
under the Clean Air Act Amendments ("CAAA"), with an alterna-
tive government sale of permits at auction. In both cases the permit
requirement increases the cost of production, but only in the latter
case does the government capture the scarcity rent in a way that al-
lows it to reduce other tax-related costs of production.
Thus the best that can be done with the revenue from an environ-
mental tax is to offset the extra cost of production that was caused by
the tax itself. The revenue is not free money.
Finally, we make a critical distinction between two types of com-
mand-and-control ("CAC") regulations. Some regulations restrict
pollution and create scarcity rents without capturing those scarcity
rents in a way that would allow government to offset the extra costs of
production (by reducing some other tax). The CAAA falls in this cat-
egory. The only advantage of this type of regulation is political feasi-
bility, because the prospects for private profits may induce firms to
support the proposal. A different kind of CAC regulation does not
create scarcity rents in the first place. Examples are policies that re-
quire all firms to use the latest technology, or otherwise to reduce
pollution per unit of output. If properly designed, this kind of require-
ment can improve the environment at minimum cost, but firms can
still pollute and produce as much as desired. Thus it does not restrict
entry and create scarcity rents. This kind of CAC policy can have the
same effects as a policy shift to a pollution tax (which further raises
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costs of production) while using the pollution tax revenues to cut an-
other tax (which reduces costs of production).
Thus, in the course of this paper, we discuss not just the double-
dividend hypothesis, but also related hypotheses about the importance
of revenue, the creation of scarcity rents, and the choice between dif-
ferent policy instruments such as taxes, subsidies, tradeable permits,
and CAC regulations. The next section develops a few analytical tools
that are essential to understand these hypotheses about the interac-
tion of environmental taxes with other tax distortions. Using these
tools, the following sections proceed to sort out the validity of various
propositions stated in the literature.
II. SECOND-BEST ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Much of the confusion about the double-dividend results from an
imprecise statement of the problem. Two important questions that
bear on the central point of the double-dividend hypothesis are often
left unasked. First, what is the starting point for the analysis? Most
existing environmental controls in the United States are CAC-type
regulations. Very few existing controls are market-based approaches,
and fewer still are environmental taxes. Yet researchers occasionally
evaluate the double-dividend hypothesis in the context of a pre-ex-
isting environmental tax. Or they assume no environmental controls
of any sort. The benefits of adding an environmental levy, however,
clearly depend on where we start. If existing CAC regulations are al-
ready stringent, as shown below, then environmental levies may have
little impact on pollution. Second, what exactly is the reform under
consideration? The effects will be very different depending on
whether the environmental tax is a replacement for existing CAC reg-
ulations or added on top of those regulations.
We will use these two questions to organize our discussion of the
double-dividend literature in the next section, but first we need to
clarify why these questions and their answers are so important. For
this purpose, we need to develop some simple analytical tools. In fact,
we need only two figures, although we use them repeatedly.
In Figure 1, the horizontal axis represents the amount of pollu-
tion (Z), which may include waste by-products that are gaseous, liq-
uid, or solid. In order to be able to produce, firms are willing to pay
for the right to pollute. Thus their "demand" for pollution reflects the
marginal benefit of pollution to production (which, in turn, reflects
the benefit to consumers of being able to buy the final product). This
19981
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marginal benefit ("MB") curve starts out high, because some minimal
level of pollution is crucial to production, and it slopes down because
additional units of pollution are successively less crucial. In the ab-
sence of any regulations or taxes, firms would pollute to the point Z° ,
where the marginal benefit of pollution equals its private marginal
cost ("PMC", which equals Po). These private marginal costs of pollu-
tion are just the costs of disposal through smokestacks or through
storage, removal, and transportation of wastes.
THE "DEMAND" FOR POLLUTION
SMC
PMC
-- ,MB
pollution
Yet the social cost of pollution is higher than the private cost,
because it imposes negative external costs on others. The social mar-
ginal cost ("SMC") of pollution is 1, which includes the private cost
plus "marginal environmental damages." Then the optimal amount of
pollution is only Z' , and the problem for policy is to cut pollution
from Z' to Z'.
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The solution of Arthur Pigou1 is to impose a tax per unit of pollu-
tion, at a rate tz, equal to the marginal external damages per unit of
pollution. This Pigouvian tax raises the private cost of pollution from
P to P' = P + tz. Then firms face costs P' and stop at Z'. The tax
revenue would be the tax rate times the amount of pollution subject to
tax, that is, the rectangle area A. In a first-best world, with no other
distortions, welfare improves by the triangle area B. This area meas-
ures the extent to which SMC exceeds the marginal benefits, for each
of those units of pollution beyond Z', up to Z.
Actual environmental policies, however, typically do not employ
this kind of tax. Instead, actual policies tend to employ CAC regula-
tions. In this model, a CAC regulation might be represented by the
mandate that "pollution shall not exceed Z'." If designed properly,
such a regulation can move the economy to the same reduced optimal
amount of pollution and provide the same triangle welfare gain, area
B.
In this context, one version of the double-dividend hypothesis
simply states that the environmental tax would both reduce pollution
(from Z ° to Z') and raise revenue. The reason this revenue is impor-
tant, according to the double-dividend hypothesis, is because it can be
used to reduce distortions caused by other taxes, such as income taxes,
that apply to labor supply. To clarify these other distortions we turn
to the next figure.
In Figure 2, the horizontal axis measures aggregate labor hours,
and the vertical axis shows the wage rate in dollars per hour. The
gross wage rate Wg is subject to tax at rate tw, so the net wage is only
Wg(l-tw). The upward-sloping labor supply curve indicates the extent
to which people are willing to work more hours if they get to keep a
higher net wage. If the initial net wage is only W,', because of existing
income taxes, then workers choose hours of labor L'. This tax im-
poses an excess burden or "deadweight loss" on the economy, triangle
area C. If the environmental problem is addressed by a pollution tax,
the double-dividend hypothesis says that the revenue can be used to
reduce the labor tax rate and shrink the size of this deadweight loss
triangle. The first dividend is the environmental gain (area B in Fig-
ure 1), and the second dividend is a smaller cost of labor taxes
(smaller area C in Figure 2).
As described in the next section, the major conceptual challenge
to the double-dividend hypothesis can also be described using Figure
1. A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932).
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THE REAL NET WAGE RATE, LABOR SUPPLY, AND
EXCESS BURDEN
Supply
I I
L' L 0
Demand
Labor Hours
2. What matters to workers is the real net wage 2 defined as the gross
wage W. times (1-tw), divided by the price of consumption goods (Pc):
Wn = Wg(1-tw)/Pc
In other words, individuals in the economy are equally affected
whether the government weie to take half their income (through tw =
.5) or to impose production taxes that double the price of consump-
tion goods (e.g., raising the price index Pc from 1 to 2). Either way,
the amount one can buy is cut in half. This insight was forgotten in
some of the early double-dividend literature, as described below, but
it is important because pollution taxes raise the cost of production and
thus raise the break-even price of output. This effect reduces the real
net wage, which offsets the increase in the real net wage made possible
by using the revenue to reduce the labor tax rate. Under certain sim-
2. See A. Lans Bovenberg & Ruud A. de Mooij, Environmental Levies and Distortionary
Taxation, 84 Am. ECON. REV. 1085 (1994).
wOg
W
-n
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plifying assumptions that represent a reasonable approximation, the
two effects exactly offset. Thus we have no general presumption that
the tax shift (from labor tax to pollution tax) can have any effect on
the real net wage, on labor supply, or on the deadweight loss from
income taxes. The second dividend can only be obtained by cutting
some other tax that is more distorting than average.
With this analytical machinery, we are now in a position to de-
scribe some of our own challenges to this literature. As just described,
some of the double-dividend literature is silent on the question of
whether permit or command-and-control regulations exist before the
pollution tax is imposed, and whether they will be removed and re-
placed by the proposed pollution tax. We use figures 1 and 2 to show
why these questions are important.
Instead of using a tax on pollution in Figure 1, authorities could
simply restrict pollution to no more than Z', either through a CAC
regulation or through a system of tradeable permits. Because the
marginal benefit of pollution exceeds the marginal cost at Z', firms
will pollute up to the legal limit. At this point, a marginal unit of
pollution continues to have private disposal cost equal to Po, but its
marginal benefit or value in production is P'. Firms are willing to pay
the difference (P' - Po) for the right to pollute, regardless of whether
they are allowed to pay for this right. If no trades are allowed, and
this value is not observed as a market price, then the difference (P" -
Po) is a "shadow price." Anybody who is allocated the limited rights
to pollute can use a unit of pollution to create value equal to P', at a
cost of only Po. The difference is a profit, or "scarcity rent."
The clearest example is the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
which sets up a system of Z' tradeable permits.3 The right to emit one
ton of sulfur dioxide sells for about $150. Anybody purchasing a per-
mit must face a cost of pollution equal to the private marginal cost
(FP) plus 150. The higher cost of production raises the equilibrium
output price. Any permit recipient can use the permit to produce and
sell its output at this new higher output price, or can sell the permit for
$150. Either way, initial recipients are handed a private profit. The
total value of the scarcity rent for Z' permits is the rectangle in Figure
1, area A.
Thus the choice between pollution restrictions and pollution taxes
is essentially a choice about who gets the scarcity rents. The pollution
3. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, 2626-31
(1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7651o (1994)).
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restriction leaves those rents in private hands, which might make the
whole program politically palatable to business. In contrast, the pollu-
tion tax would capture area A as tax revenue. Either way, the cost of
pollution rises from P' to P', which raises the equilibrium output price
(Pc) and therefore reduces the real net wage. If the real net wage is
reduced from W,,° to W,' in Figure 2, then the deadweight loss in the
labor market increases by area D! If the only environmental protec-
tion is in the form of such quantity restrictions (CAC regulation or
permits), then the benefit of environmental protection (area B in Fig-
ure 1) is at least partly offset by the social cost of the reduction in the
real net wage (area D). This extra cost can exceed the environmental
benefits. 4 Even starting from an uncorrected externality, where firms
face only the private costs and pollute to point Z0, even a small restric-
tion on pollution can easily reduce overall welfare.
While this CAC regulation raises output prices, and thus exacer-
bates the labor supply distortion, the pollution tax instead can capture
the scarcity rents and use the revenue to reduce the income tax rate
and thereby offset the effect of output prices on the real net wage.
This logic suggests no second dividend. The pollution tax revenue
cannot in general be used to reduce the labor distortion, but it can be
used to avoid an increase in the labor distortion. If so, welfare can
still rise by the first dividend-environmental protection.
We are now in position to describe the importance of the starting
point for the double-dividend hypothesis. If the particular pollutant is
not subject to any existing controls, then the proposed pollution tax
might raise product prices, but the proposal can use the revenues to
cut the labor tax and offset the adverse effect of product prices on the
real net wage. That combination leaves just the first dividend, envi-
ronmental protection, but no second dividend.
Suppose that existing CAC regulations, however, have already cut
pollution from Z ° to Z' in Figure 1, raising the value of pollution
above its private cost P0 . Somebody is getting the scarcity rent. In
this world, the imposition of a small pollution tax raises the private
cost of pollution above P", but that just cuts into the scarcity rent. As
long as the benefits of pollution (P') at the restricted quantity (Z')
exceed the private cost of pollution (P' plus the tax), firms will still
emit up to the legal limit (Z'). Thus, a small pollution levy has no
impact on pollution or on the output price. It does raise revenue,
4. See Ian W.H. Parry, Environmental Taxes and Quotas in the Presence of Distorting Taxes
in Factor Markets, 19 REsoURcE & ENERGY ECON. 203 (1997).
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however, by taking part of the scarcity rent. In this case, the previous
results are reversed. This proposed pollution tax does not have any
first dividend, since it does nothing to improve the environment, but it
does provide a second dividend! With a pre-existing quantity restric-
tion, the pollution tax does not raise product prices but does provide
revenue that can be used to reduce labor tax distortions.
In effect, the first dividend-increased environmental protec-
tion-was generated by the existing regulations. The second dividend
comes by shifting to an environmental policy that preserves that first
dividend while raising revenue that can be used to finance a reduction
in other taxes. The magnitude of this second dividend depends on the
relative size of the tax increase versus the stringency, of the existing
environmental regulations. If the tax rate is set to the full difference
(P,-P0 ), then all of the scarcity rents will be captured.
Second, we ask, what is the reform under consideration? Are en-
vironmental levies being enacted to supplement existing pollution re-
strictions (such as CAC regulations) or are they being used to replace
existing restrictions? Again, Figure 1 illustrates the importance of this
question. Consider a proposed environmental levy that is smaller
than the scarcity rent (P,-Po). If that levy is added on top of existing
CAC regulations that reduce pollution to Z', then it has no impact on
pollution. On the other hand, if the small pollution tax is to replace
the CAC regulations, then pollution could actually increase. Whether
pollution would increase or decrease depends on the size of the tax
relative to the stringency of the existing CAC regulations. We do not
mean to argue that the outcome of this example is general but merely
to point out that different experiments lead to different outcomes.
Also, when we ask, "what exactly is the reform under considera-
tion?" we mean that the proposal needs to specify how the revenue
will be used, or how the required revenue will be raised. In this con-
nection, an interesting result is that an environmental subsidy can
have exactly the same effects as an environmental tax-even though
one policy raises revenue and the other reduces revenue. The reason
is because of effects on the real net wage (see Figure 2). We showed
above that a tax on pollution raises the cost of production, which low-
ers the real net wage and would exacerbate the labor supply distortion
unless the revenue is used to cut the labor tax rate. The two effects on
the real net wage offset each other. For a subsidy to pollution abate-
ment, the effects are symmetric. The subsidy effectively reduces the
cost of production, which would tend to reduce the equilibrium
(break-even) price of output. The lower price, Pc, serves to raise the
1998]
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real net wage except that the subsidy must be financed by raising the
labor tax. Again the two effects offset, and the real net wage is unaf-
fected. Neither policy has a second dividend, but both policies can
have the same first dividend-environmental improvement.
For these reasons, we conclude that revenue is not the key to un-
derstanding the efficacy of environmental policy. The key is to avoid
policies that create scarcity rents left in private hands. Such a policy
raises the cost of production unnecessarily and exacerbates the labor
tax distortion. Certainly pollution tax revenue might be important as
a way to capture those scarcity rents, but a 100% profits tax would do
just as well. The point is not to leave rents in private hands.
Yet not all CAC regulations create scarcity rents in the first place.
Subsequent sections will use these same analytical tools to describe a
"technology restriction" that has the same net benefits of environmen-
tal protection (area B) without exacerbating the labor distortion. This
policy has no revenue consequences, but can perform just as well as
the pollution tax with revenue used to reduce the labor tax rate. The
key is that it does not create scarcity rents.
Before we proceed to those new results, we use this analytical
machinery to review some of the existing literature. In particular, we
consider how other authors address the two key questions.
III. THE EARLY LITERATURE
Gordon Tullock might be the first to recognize the potential sig-
nificance of the revenue from environmental levies, even before the
"double-dividend" terminology. 5 He notes that he and other econo-
mists had ignored an essential fact about pollution taxes: "Govern-
ments need money, and the return from charges on externality is a
possible source of such funds."'6 Tullock frames his hypothesis as fol-
lows: "If the external cost [associated with the externality] is large, it
is quite possible that the government revenue will be 'free,' that is,
that the private sector will be as large, or larger, after the government
has taken its revenue as it was before."' 7 Tullock notes that this point
had never occurred to him before, nor to a number of other econo-
mists including "a member of the President's Council of Economic
Advisers, a holder of the John Bates Clark medal, and an economist
5. See Gordon Tbllock, Excess Benefit, 3 WATER RESOURCES REs. 643, 643 (1967).
6. Id.
7. Id.
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who is a recognized leader in research in both [environmental eco-
nomics and public finance]." 8
For Tullock, the starting point appears to be the existing system
of non-environmental taxes and environmental regulations. "The
American tradition is inclined toward placing upon private industry
the cost of processing industrial effluents to reduce the quantity of
wastes, but it relies upon stream flow standards and specific orders
rather than the economic pressure of prices to control the process."9
Tullock recognizes that we already have environmental regulations in
place, and that we rely on distorting taxes to raise revenue for essen-
tial government activities. In fact, the title of his paper, Excess Bene-
fit, is designed to contrast directly with the notion of excess burden.
The idea is that properly designed environmental levies do not gener-
ate excess burden but rather excess benefits.
The experiment that underlies Tullock's statement of the double-
dividend hypothesis is less clear. At one point, the reform appears to
introduce a tax that would improve environmental quality and provide
the first dividend (area B in Figure 1): "If some activity imposes an
external cost, then a properly calculated tax on it will reduce the total
output of the private sector by less than the revenue received by the
government."' 0 Later Tullock suggests that environmental levies
could replace regulations: "The removal of these [polluting] activities
from the criminal code and their listing as heavily taxed items in the
revenue act would not only increase freedom by widening the individ-
ual's opportunity set [by making pollution legal but costly], it would
also contribute at least some revenue to the government."' 1 Now the
experiment does not affect environmental quality, but simply raises
revenue by capturing the scarcity rent (area A in Figure 1). Tullock is
right that this revenue can be used to cut the labor tax, but it does not
provide any additional environmental protection.
The scope of the experiment is also unclear. At times he appears
to suggest a large-scale replacement of pre-existing taxes with envi-
ronmental levies. At other times he suggests a more piecemeal ap-
proach: "A careful inspection of our legal prohibitions to see if there
are not some activities that would be better taxed would almost cer-
8. Id.
9. Id. at 644 (quoting William Whipple, Jr., Economic Basis for Effluent Charges and Sub-
sidies, 2 WATER RESOURCES REs. 159, 159 (1966)).
10. Tuilock, supra note 5, at 643.
11. Id. at 644.
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tainly turn up at least some cases where the change would be
desirable."' 2
David Terkla is one of the first to estimate the revenues that
could be raised by shifting to a system of national effluent taxes in lieu
of CAC regulations.13 He focuses on particulates and sulfur oxide
emissions from stationary sources, and he estimates that taxes on just
these two pollutants would provide enough revenue to reduce excess
burden from labor taxes by an amount between $1 to $5 billion (in
1982 dollars). 14 Terkla answers both of our two key questions. The
starting point for his analysis is the existing system of environmental
controls, and the experiment he undertakes is to levy a tax at precisely
the level that mimics the existing system of environmental regulations:
"The taxes are chosen so as to equal the marginal cost of reducing
emissions of each pollutant at the level of emissions currently allowed
by the national standards. '15 In effect, Terkla's reform is both envi-
ronmentally neutral and revenue-neutral.
In terms of Figure 1, Terkla assumes that regulations are in place
that reduce pollution to Z'. He then sets the tax rate so that the mar-
ginal cost of pollution (including the tax) rises to P'. Thus firms will
choose to maintain pollution at Z', regardless of whether they are le-
gally limited to only Z'. He designs a conceptual experiment such that
environmental quality is unaffected. He does not indicate whether the
existing environmental regulations will be eliminated, but the experi-
ment is designed to make them irrelevant.
Because Terkla designs the experiment to leave environmental
quality unchanged, the only benefits from this policy are the revenues
that are available to reduce other distorting taxes. To quantify the
benefits from this reform, Terkla uses estimates from the existing liter-
ature of the excess burden per dollar of additional tax revenues. 16 For
labor income taxes, Terkla estimates an excess burden of $0.35 per
dollar of additional labor income tax revenues. 17 For the corporate
income tax, he uses an estimate of $0.56.1 Terkla estimates that any-
where between $1.8 and $8.7 billion can be raised nationally from
12. Id.
13. David Terkla, The Efficiency Value of Effluent Tax Revenues, 11 J. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGMT. 107 (1984).
14. See id. at 107.
15. Id. at 109.
16. See id. at 114
17. See id.
18. See id.
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taxes on particulates and sulfur dioxide emissions. 19 Thus, Terkla ar-
gues, if $1.8 billion of environmental taxes are raised, and used to
lower the corporate income tax, the reform will provide ($1.8 bil-
lion) (.56) = $1 billion of reduced excess burden in the U.S. economy.20
At his high-end, a $8.7 billion revenue estimate would translate into
$4.9 billion of reduced excess burden.
Caution is necessary before extrapolating from Terkla's efficiency
findings. Terkla has carefully designed an experiment so that the effi-
ciency costs of the environmental taxes are zero. His tax has no effect
on output prices because it just captures the scarcity rent. Other envi-
ronmental tax proposals do affect output prices, but some subsequent
researchers attempting to follow Terkla simply ignore those effects
and the efficiency tcosts of environmental taxes. Recall that Terkla's
environmental tax has no efficiency cost because he begins with regu-
lations that have already reduced pollution to Z' and then implements
a tax chosen so that the equilibrium level of pollution is unchanged. 21
Thus the efficiency loss associated with environmental policy arises
from the pre-existing set of environmental regulations; the shift from
regulations to taxes will not alter that distortion. Put differently, Ter-
kla's reform is environmentally neutral and revenue-neutral, while
other reforms in the double-dividend literature are only revenue-neu-
tral. The change in environmental quality in these latter studies has
both benefits (less pollution) and costs (lower real net wage).
Terkla does not attempt to estimate the optimal tax on pollutants
in a second-best world.22 He does speculate, however, that the opti-
mal environmental tax rate exceeds the social marginal damage be-
cause of the revenue that the tax generates. 23 But this conclusion does
not follow from his analysis, because his experiment has been care-
fully designed to eliminate any excess burden from the environmental
tax by having it replace an otherwise equivalent regulatory system.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 109.
22. "[T]he purpose of this paper is not to select the optimal effluent tax, but to provide an
estimate of the order of magnitude of. revenues which can be raised from a tax designed to
achieve the current national standards .... Id. at 111.
23. "[G]iven the relatively large excess burden associated with other tax revenues, there
may be a net efficiency gain by raising the effluent tax rate beyond the optimal level, if this were
to raise more revenue." Id. at 115.
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Dwight R. Lee and Walter S. Misiolek 24 accept Terkla's argu-
ment that environmental levies confer a positive benefit by raising
revenue, and they extend the analysis to consider the optimal environ-
mental tax rate.25 This is a new direction in the analysis, as previous
researchers had not considered the relationship between the social
marginal damage from pollution and the optimal tax rate in an econ-
omy with pre-existing distortions. In part, the motivation for their
analysis is the speculation by Terkla that the optimal environmental
tax rate might exceed the social marginal damage of pollution.26 This
speculation, however, was not at the center of Terkla's analysis, nor
does it relate particularly to the experiment that he carries out.
Lee and Misiolek construct a simple cost-benefit framework to
analyze whether the pre-existing tax distortions make the optimal en-
vironmental tax rate higher or lower than the Pigouvian prescription
(which would set the tax rate equal to the social marginal damage
from pollution). 27 The tax reform is revenue-neutral, because tax rev-
enues are used to lower other distorting taxes, but the paper is silent
on the presence of any pre-existing environmental regulations. If this
silence indicates the absence of other regulations, then this paper pro-
poses an experiment that is very different from the one in Terkla. This
difference has contributed to the confusion over the nature of the
double-dividend. Whereas Terkla carefully constructed an experiment
so that environmental taxes have no deadweight loss, Lee and Misi-
olek simply ignore the fact that the environmental tax might well have
deadweight loss (by reducing the real net wage). They just focus on
the revenue potential.28
Their model is very simple, and much like the model underlying
Figure 1. Pollution provides benefits to producers, with declining mar-
ginal benefits (like the MB curve in Figure 1). Private marginal costs
of pollution can be represented here by Po, and social marginal costs
(P) are higher than private marginal cost. In the absence of govern-
mental intervention, firms would pollute to the point where the incre-
mental benefit from additional pollution is driven down to the level of
24. Dwight R. Lee & Walter S. Misiolek, Substituting Pollution Taxation for General Taxa-
tion: Some Implications for Efficiency in Pollutions Taxation, 13 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 338
(1986).
25. "Our purpose is to take explicitly into consideration the nonenvironmental benefit gen-
erated by pollution taxation and to examine the impact which this benefit has on the analysis of
the efficient pollution tax." Id. at 339.
26. See Terkla, supra note 13, at 115. Terkla cautions that this would need to be tested in a
general equilibrium model which would account for all relevant price changes. See id.
27. See Lee & Misiolek, supra note 24, at 339.
28. See id. at 339-40.
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private marginal cost (at point Z°). With a Pigouvian tax, tz, equal to
marginal environmental damages, firms would face a cost of pollution
equal to P' = P0 + tz. At this price P', firms would reduce pollution to
Z.
Lee and Misiolek then consider an increase in the tax above the
Pigouvian rate. 29 This increase has multiple effects. First, if the small
increase in the environmental tax rate raises additional revenue, then
the other tax can be reduced and welfare raised. Second, the small
increase in the tax rate above the Pigouvian rate will decrease pollu-
tion. This decrease in pollution itself has both costs and benefits. The
social cost of reducing pollution is the value of what it produces (the
height of the MB curve), while the social benefit of reducing pollution
is the averted damages (the height of the SMC curve). Because the
optimal point Z' was found where these two heights were equal, a
small cut in pollution from this point provides no net gain or loss.
Thus, for Lee and Misiolek, the whole case for a tax rate greater than
the Pigouvian rate rests on whether the higher tax rate will raise addi-
tional tax revenue. 30 In their words, the revenue "provides an effi-
ciency benefit by offsetting revenues raised by other taxes and
reducing the distortions associated with those taxes."'31 They assume
that this "tax substitution" benefit is positive, and that it falls as envi-
ronmental tax revenues increase.
Lee and Misiolek's approach focuses attention sharply on the rev-
enue-raising potential of the environmental tax, but in the process it
entirely ignores potential efficiency costs (through effects on the real
net wage). 32 Recall that an environmental tax raises the price of
goods that generate pollution as a by-product of production, and that
these increased prices exacerbate pre-existing distortions from com-
modity or wage taxes. This effect calls into question the very premise
that the tax substitution benefit is positive.
The fundamental flaw in the Lee and Misiolek paper is that their
tax substitution function is not derived from underlying economic the-
ory. It led them to an erroneous conclusion that has been perpetuated
by proponents of the double-dividend notion, namely, that the opti-
29. See id.
30. Specifically, the increase in the tax rate will raise revenue if the tax elasticity of pollu-
tion demand is less than one. The tax elasticity of pollution demand is the percentage change in
demand for pollution by firms as the tax on pollution is raised by one percent.
31. Lee & Misiolek, supra note 24, at 340.
32. See Wallace E. Oates, Pollution Charges as a Source of Public Revenues, in EcoNoMIc
PROGRESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS 135 (Herbert Giersch ed., 1993) (stressing revenue
considerations for the choice of the optimal rate on pollution).
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mal tax on pollution exceeds the Pigouvian tax rate whenever increas-
ing the environmental tax beyond the Pigouvian level would raise
revenue.
33
Our interpretation is that this early literature emphasizes the rev-
enue from environmental levies. Tullock raised the possibility that the
government revenue will be "free," while Terkla estimated the
amount of revenue and the efficiency gains from using it. For Lee and
Misiolek, the whole benefit of raising the pollution tax depends on
whether it raises revenue. We now show how this emphasis on reve-
nue continues in the double-dividend literature.
IV. THE DOUBLE-DIVIDEND HYPOTHESIS
In the late 1980s, concern grew over global warming and other
environmental problems. Concern also grew over the federal budget
deficit in the United States, and environmental levies seemed a pain-
less way to raise funds to ease the deficit burden. David Pearce34 is
perhaps the first writer to use the term "double-dividend:"
Governments may then adopt a fiscally neutral stance on the carbon
tax, using revenues to finance reductions in incentive-distorting
taxes such as income tax, or corporation tax. This "double-divi-
dend" feature of a pollution tax is of critical importance in the polit-
ical debate about the means of securing a "carbon convention. '35
Notice the continued emphasis on revenues from the environ-
mental tax. Pearce explicitly had in mind an emerging environmental
problem with no current regulations, and a new carbon tax that would
generate revenues that could be used to lower other distorting taxes.
Because carbon emissions are not currently regulated, however, this
experiment is qualitatively different from Terkla's experiment in
33. As pointed out by A.L. Bovenberg & F. van der Ploeg, Environmental Policy, Public
Finance and the Labour Market in a Second-Best World, 55 J. PUB. ECON. 349, 360 n.7 (1994), a
close reading of Agnar Sandmo, Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Externalities, 77 SWEDISH J.
ECON. 86 (1975), exposes the fallacy of this argument. Sandmo calculates the optimal tax rate on
pollution for a system in which other distorting taxes are required to meet revenue needs. See
Sandmo, supra, at 93. Consider a set of preferences such that, ignoring pollution, the optimal tax
structure is a uniform tax on all goods. Such a tax can be imposed by explicitly taxing all com-
modities at the same rate or by simply implementing a wage tax. Sandmo shows that, in such a
world, the optimal tax on pollution would equal the social marginal damages divided by the cost
to the private sector of having the government raise an additional dollar. See id. Using Terkla's
estimate described above, the cost to the private sector is $1.35 for the government to raise one
dollar by a tax on personal income. Thus, so long as distorting taxes are necessary, this private
cost exceeds $1, and the optimal tax rate on pollution is less than the marginal social damage
from pollution.
34. David Pearce, The Role of Carbon Taxes in Adjusting to Global Warming, 101 ECON. J.
938 (1991).
35. Id. at 940.
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which emissions were held constant. Indeed, Pearce acknowledges
that the carbon tax may indeed have efficiency costs: "Carbon taxes
themselves will impose a deadweight loss which has to be set against
the gain from the reduced externality from global warming. '36 Unlike
the tax in Terkla's experiment, Pearce's carbon tax is intended to
change behavior. It reduces carbon use by raising the cost of carbon,
but that necessarily raises the cost of production and thus reduces the
real net wage.
Robert Repetto, Roger C. Dower, Robin Jenkins, and Jacqueline
Geoghegan ("Repetto et al.") take up this theme in Green Fees: How
a Tax Shift Can Work for the Environment and the Economy.37 While
the book's title suggests a revenue-neutral shift, the idea is extended
both to revenue-neutral shifts and to green fees that are used to re-
duce the federal deficit. In either case, the argument for the policy
can be summed up as follows: "Taxes on these environmentally dam-
aging activities [resource waste, pollution, and congestion] would not
distort economic decisions, but rather would correct existing distor-
tions. ' '38 Elsewhere, the authors quantify the two dividends and add
them together:
Reducing tax rates on income and profits would reduce the margi-
nal excess burden by $0.40 to $0.60 per dollar of reduced tax reve-
nue. If those revenues were regained through environmental
charges, the additional net economic savings would range from
$0.05 to $0.20 per dollar of revenue. These additional net savings
are the averted environmental damages less the incremental costs of
environmental protection. Putting these parts together yields the
striking conclusion that the total possible gain from shifting to envi-
ronmental charges could easily be $0.45 to $0.80 per dollar of tax
shifted from "goods" to "bads" with no loss of revenues. 39
This quote also emphasizes revenue. Repetto et al. fall into the same
trap as Lee and Misiolek by ignoring the efficiency costs associated
with driving up the price of products that produce pollution as a by-
product. As shown above, those costs offset the efficiency gains from
36. Id. at 943. Pearce cites John Whalley & Randall Wigle, The International Incidence of
Carbon Taxes, in GLOBAL WARMING: ECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSES 233 (Rudiger Dornbusch
& James Poterba eds., 1991), which suggests that a large carbon tax (based on the consumption
of carbon embodied in products) would create economic losses on the order of 1.2% of GNP.
See id. at 258. These results come from a large scale numerical simulation model that does not
explicitly recycle the revenues (as would the double-dividend hypothesis). See id. passim.
Rather, each country receives tax proceeds and presumably distributes them in some lump-sum
fashion. See id.
37. ROBERT REPETTO ET AL., GREEN FEES: How A TAX SHIFT CAN WORK FOR THE ENVI-
RONMENT AND THE ECONOMY (1992).
38. Id. at 2.
39. Id. at 11.
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reducing reliance on income taxes. Under certain reasonable assump-
tions regarding consumer preferences, the environmental tax reduces
the real net wage by exactly the same amount as the income tax reduc-
tion can raise the real net wage. Again, the key issue is that Repetto et
al. have in mind a new environmental protection, which is an experi-
ment very different from the one in Terkla. When Terkla uses the
pollution tax to replace existing environmental controls, the switch
has no effect on the amount of pollution, the cost of production, the
real net wage, or labor supply distortions. 40
In the progression from Terkla to Repetto et al., a crucial change
occurred in the experiment under consideration. No longer was the
experiment an environmentally neutral switch from CAC regulation
to pollution taxes (an experiment that yields only the second divi-
dend). Instead, the experiment is stated in terms of revenue-neutral-
ity: the environmentall taxes are implemented to reduce distorting
taxes. Meanwhile, this "new" experiment increases both environmen-
tal protection and the cost of producing goods that generate pollution.
If the increase in the real net wage from the cut in the labor tax is
exactly offset by the decrease in the real net wage from the higher
price of goods, then this new experiment yields only the first dividend.
Neither experiment yields both dividends.
Lawrence H. Goulder reviews this early double-dividend litera-
ture, but concentrates on this new type of experiment in his taxon-
omy.41 His perspective helps explain the movement away from
Terkla's experiment. Goulder notes that quantifying the benefits from
improving the environment is very difficult.42 Thus the public case for
the policy is much easier to make if green taxes do not require an
exact numerical value for the environmental improvement:
Policymakers who are interested in green tax swaps are often frus-
trated by the uncertainties as to the values of the environmental
benefits that would result from such swaps. Under these conditions,
the no-cost idea is especially appealing. If revenue-neutral environ-
mental tax policies are costless, then the burden of proof facing the
policy maker is much reduced: to justify the environmental tax on
benefit-cost grounds, it suffices to know the sign of the environmen-
tal benefits-to know that they are positive. If costs are zero (or
negative), this guarantees positive net benefits.... Thus the debate
about the double dividend reflects the desire to be able to make
40. In these static models, we ignore possible effects of the pollution tax on incentives to
invent new technologies that might abate pollution more cheaply.
41. See Lawrence H. Goulder, Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend: A
Reader's Guide, 2 IrNr'L TAX & PUB. FiN. 157 (1995).
42. See id. at 158.
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safe judgments about environmental reforms in the presence of
uncertainty.43
Goulder has in mind a revenue-neutral experiment that raises envi-
ronmental quality. Within the context of the experiment he has in
mind, his distinction among various double-dividend hypotheses is
very useful.44 However, Goulder does not really discuss a version of
the double-dividend hypothesis that involves the Terkla experiment.
The focus on revenue has been emphasized further by a number
of authors, including Charles L. Ballard and Steven G. Medema.45
They build a numerical simulation model with multiple industries, va-
riable pollution per unit of output, and effects of pollution both on
consumers and other producers. Using this model, they compare a tax
on pollution with a subsidy to pollution abatement. The tax raises
revenue that is used to lower a labor income tax, while the subsidy is
financed by raising the labor income tax. They find that the welfare
gains from the pollution tax are roughly three times as great as the
gains from the subsidy, and thus conclude that the revenue explains
the different welfare findings: "Pigouvian taxes are usually more effi-
cient than Pigouvian subsidies, since the tax revenue can be used to
reduce other taxes." 46
While Ballard and Medema's model and results are major contri-
butions and undoubtedly correct, we would like to propose a different
interpretation of their results. The two policies differ in a subtle but
important way. The Pigouvian tax reduces pollution through two
channels. First, it encourages abatement activities through a "substi-
tution effect" as clean inputs replace pollution as an input to produc-
tion. This effect reduces the pollution per unit of output. Second, it
raises the overall cost of production through an "output effect" that
discourages production and consumption of goods associated with
pollution. Even without abatement activities, this output effect would
reduce pollution. In contrast, the Pigouvian subsidy reduces pollution
43. Id. at 158-59.
44. Goulder distinguishes among three double-dividend claims: (1) a weak form, (2) an in-
termediate form, and (3) a strong form. The weak form argues that it is always preferable to
return environmental revenues by reducing a distorting tax rather than by returning them in a
lump sum fashion. This weak form of the proposition has not been disputed. The intermediate
and strong forms consider whether excess burden increases or decreases as a result of a shift
towards environmental taxation. The intermediate form is a hypothesis that some existing tax is
distorting enough that excess burden would fall by shifting from that tax to an environmental
tax. The strong form is a hypothesis that excess burden will fall when environmental taxes are
substituted for typical taxes in use. See id. at 159.
45. Charles L. Ballard & Steven G. Medema, The Marginal Efficiency Effects of Taxes and
Subsidies in the Presence of Externalities, 52 J. PuB. ECON. 199 (1993).
46. Id. at 199.
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only through the first abatement channel, not through the second out-
put channel. In fact, the reduction in production costs (due to Ballard
and Medema's abatement subsidy) has the effect of raising output.
An alternative subsidy experiment would lead to the same results
as Ballard and Medema's pollution tax experiment. Suppose the gov-
ernment were to subsidize pollution abatement (to get the substitution
effect) and simultaneously subsidize the consumption of goods that do
not produce pollution. The decrease in the relative price of clean
goods would induce consumers to shift away from polluting goods in a
way that is exactly analogous to the output effect described above.
The combination of the two subsidies reduces pollution in precisely
the same manner as the pollution tax. Lower product prices (resulting
from the subsidies) reduce the price level Pc and thus offset the effect
on the real net wage of the higher income tax tw required to finance
the subsidies.47 This combination of subsidies in the Ballard and
Medema model would have the same effects as the pollution tax.
This subsidy to all clean goods might be difficult to implement,
but it highlights the important conceptual point that revenue differ-
ences do not matter if the two policies are designed to have the same
effects on all relative prices. In fact, other subsidy schemes might be
more feasible. Another policy that would mimic the effects of the pol-
lution tax is the combination of a subsidy to all clean inputs to produc-
tion (to get the substitution effect) and a tax on the output of that
industry (to get the output effect).48 The abatement subsidy of Bal-
lard and Medema performed less well than the pollution tax, not be-
cause it cost revenue but because it did not discourage pollution
through the output effect as well as the substitution effect.
V. CHALLENGES TO THE DOUBLE-DIVIDEND HYPOTHESIS
The first serious challenge to the double-dividend hypothesis was
raised by A. Lans Bovenberg and Ruud A. de Mooi. 49 They posit a
double-dividend in which environmental levies not only increase envi-
47. Like several of the models reviewed here, the model of Ballard and Medema assumes
"separability." While labor supply is affected by the overall real net wage, it is not affected by
the price of any particular consumption good, by the quality of the environment, or by the gov-
ernment's provision of a public good.
48. See Don Fullerton, Environmental Levies and Distortionary Taxation: Comment, 87 AM.
ECON. REv. 245 (1997) (calling either of these combinations a "two-part instrument" and show-
ing equivalence to a pollution tax). Explicit derivations of several two-part instruments are pro-
vided by DON FULLERTON & ANN WOLVERTON, THE CASE FOR A Two-PART INSTRUMENT:
PREsUmvrlVE TAX AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUBSIDY (National Bureau of Econ. Research Work-
ing Paper No. 5993, 1997).
49. Bovenberg & de Mooij, supra note 2.
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ronmental quality but also produce a less distortionary tax system.
Using a simple general equilibrium model with competitive firms, they
show "that environmental taxes typically exacerbate, rather than alle-
viate, preexisting tax distortions-even if revenues are employed to
cut preexisting distortionary taxes."'50 The model of Bovenberg and
de Mooij has two goods, one of which adversely affects the environ-
ment as it is consumed (a "dirty" good). 51 Taxes are assessed on labor
income and on the dirty good. The starting point is where the tax rate
equals the social marginal damage from pollution (the Pigouvian tax
rate).
Bovenberg and de Mooij then consider a small increase in the tax
on the dirty good, and show that a revenue-neutral change in the tax
mix might affect utility for a typical member of society in two ways.
First, this tax change can affect the real net wage and labor supply.52
Second, it can affect pollution through consumption of the dirty
good.53 For Lee and Misiolek, this decrease in pollution itself has
both costs and benefits: the social cost of reducing pollution is the
value of what it produces (the height of the MB curve in Figure 1),
while the social benefit of reducing pollution is the averted damages
(the height of the SMC curve). 54 Because the optimal point Z' was
found where these two heights were equal, a small cut in pollution
from this point provides no net gain or loss. Thus, for Bovenberg and
de Mooij, the whole case for a tax rate greater that the Pigouvian rate
rests on how the tax change affects labor supply. If the tax reform
reduces labor supply then society is worse off, while if the reform in-
creases labor supply then society is better off. The intuition for this
result is straightforward from Figure 2. The pre-existing labor tax is
already reducing labor supply below the socially optimal amount, with
excess burden equal to area C. Anything that reduces labor supply
further has a first order cost in terms of welfare, area D. Even though
the tax change and the effect on the real net wage may be quite small,
the effect on deadweight loss (area D) is relatively large. Conversely,
if the tax reform induces an increase in labor supply, then the size of
the excess burden triangle (area C) would be reduced.
Before proceeding further, it is useful to consider the experiment
of Bovenberg and de Mooij more carefully. First, the experiment
50. Id. at 1085.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 1087.
53. See id.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
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does not hold environmental quality constant (as in Terkla's case 55).
Second, the starting point has taxes on the dirty good currently in
place and equal to the social marginal damage of pollution. Third, no
consideration is given to the possibility of other environmental con-
trols. Thus, Bovenberg and de Mooij's experiment differs significantly
from much of the previous literature. Tullock and Terkla each have in
mind the substitution of environmental taxes for other non-tax con-
trols, so that revenue is raised without altering environmental quality.
Both of these prior authors begin from a position where no environ-
mental taxes are in place. Then Repetto et al. have in mind an im-
provement in environmental quality, but like Tullock and Terkla they
assume little current reliance on environmental levies. Strictly speak-
ing, these authors all differ from Bovenberg and de Mooij by assuming
that existing environmental levies are set below social marginal dam-
age. In contrast, it was Lee and Misiolek who claimed that the opti-
mal tax rate on a dirty good would exceed the social marginal damage
so long as it raises revenue starting at that point.56 Thus, Bovenberg
and de Mooij really provide a response to only Lee and Misiolek, by
showing that the pollution tax is less than social marginal damage.57
Note, however, that any claims about the size of the tax rate relative
to social marginal damage is something altogether different from the
original hypotheses of Tullock and Terkla or the double-dividend hy-
pothesis of Pearce or Repetto et al. Those authors never said "there-
fore the tax on pollution ought to exceed environmental damages."
Starting at a point where the tax on the dirty good equals social
marginal damage, Bovenberg and de Mooij show that an increase in
the tax on the dirty good increases welfare if and only if it increases
labor supply. 58 To investigate employment effects, they make a series
of assumptions about consumption preferences that imply that in the
absence of environmental externalities, the optimal tax would be a
uniform commodity tax or equivalently a wage tax.59
55. See Terkla, supra note 13, at 109.
56. See Lee & Misiolek, supra note 24.
57. As shown in Fullerton, supra note 48, Bovenberg and de Mooij's proof depends on the
particular normalization that they use in their model. A more precise statement of their result is
that the optimal difference between the tax rate on the dirty good and the tax rate on the clean
good is less than the social marginal damage from pollution.
58. See Bovenberg & de Mooij, supra note 2, at 1086.
59. Specifically, they assume that private goods are weakly separable from public goods and
environmental quality in the utility function. See id. at 1087. Furthermore, the two consumption
goods enter utility through a homothetic sub-utility function from which leisure is weakly separa-
ble. See id. Yew-Kwang Ng, Optimal Corrective Taxes or Subsidies when Revenue Raising Im-
poses an Excess Burden, 70 AM. EcoN. REv. 744, 745 (1980), investigated the optimal
environmental tax when the polluting good is not separable from leisure. He found that it may
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Thus, the experiment begins at a point that would be the optimal
tax in the absence of an externality, except that the tax on the dirty
good is set equal to social marginal damage. Starting at this point,
Bovenberg and de Mooij show that an increase in the pollution tax
would induce a decrease in labor supply. 60 Despite the fact that the
revenues from the environmental tax are used to lower the tax on
labor supply, the real net wage falls. The increase in the after-tax
nominal wage cannot entirely make up for the increase in the price of
goods (resulting from the environmental tax increase), because the tax
base erodes as consumers substitute away from the dirty good. Be-
cause raising the tax above social marginal damages reduces welfare,
lowering the tax below its Pigouvian level will raise welfare, proving
Bovenberg and de Mooij's point that "[i]n this 'second-best' case with
distortionary taxation, therefore, the optimal environmental tax lies
below the social damage from pollution."'61 At the end of the paper,
the authors return to the double-dividend debate and point out that if
revenues from the environmental levy are returned lump-sum rather
than through a reduction in the labor tax, then the reduction in em-
ployment is larger. "Hence, there exists a 'doubled [sic] dividend' in
the sense that a cost reduction can be achieved by using revenues
from pollution taxes to cut distortionary taxes rather than returning
these revenues in a lump-sum fashion. ' 62 This is a statement of Goul-
der's "weak form" of the double-dividend.
Ian W.H. Parry63 considers similar questions to those asked by
Bovenberg and de Mooij using an analytical framework developed by
Arnold C. Harberger. 64 Like Bovenberg and de Mooij, Parry ignores
any environmental regulations and assumes the presence of a tax on
labor income. Unlike those authors, Parry considers an experiment of
implementing a new tax on the polluting good where the tax is no
greater than the marginal social costs of pollution. He shows that the
be optimal to provide a subsidy to the polluting good, financed by a higher wage tax, in the case
where the cross price effect of the higher wage on reducing consumption of the polluting good is
more important than the own price effect of the subsidized price on increasing consumption of
the polluting good. See id. passim. Ng emphasizes that this is an unusual but not impossible
outcome. See id. at 745. Ian W.H. Parry, Pollution Taxes and Revenue Recycling, 29 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. S-64 (1995), has also allowed for leisure to be more or less substitutable with
the dirty good than with the clean good. See also J. Andrzs Espinosa & V. Kerry Smith, Measur-
ing the Environmental Consequences of Trade Policy: A Nonmarket CGE Analysis, 77 AM. J.
AGRIC. ECON. 772 (1995) (emphasizing the importance of non-separability).
60. See Bovenberg & de Mooij, supra note 2.
61. Id. at 1088.
62. Id. at 1089.
63. Parry, supra note 59.
64. Arnold C. Harberger, The Measurement of Waste, 54 AM. ECON. REv. 58 (1964).
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benefits from the increased revenue from the new tax (the "revenue
effect" in his terminology) is only greater than social costs arising
from reduced labor supply (the "interdependency effect") if the pol-
luting good is a relatively weak substitute for leisure. 65 To interpret
Parry's result, recall the explanation of Bovenberg and de Mooij for
their result: the higher tax on the polluting good induces consumers to
substitute away from the polluting good, which erodes the tax base,
which requires a higher tax on labor, which reduces employment.
This tax base effect is reduced to the extent that the polluting good is a
complement with leisure, because then a tax on the polluting good
discourages both that good and leisure, which increases labor supply.
If the relative complementarity is strong enough, the revenue effect
will be greater than the interdependency effect and social costs from
the tax system fall (ignoring improvements in the environment).
Parry proceeds to estimate the ratio of the optimal tax rate on the
polluting good to the social marginal damages from pollution. Esti-
mates of this ratio range widely, depending on parameter assump-
tions, but rarely do they exceed one. His central case estimate is that
the optimal pollution tax is 63% of marginal environmental
damages. 66
In a series of papers, Lawrence Goulder and various co-authors
have used numerical simulation models to investigate the double-divi-
dend hypothesis, along with the related issue of instrument choice, in
more realistic economies. 67 Consider, for example, the model and ex-
periment described by Bovenberg and Goulder.68 Production occurs
in thirteen competitive industries, from which seventeen consumption
65. See Parry, supra note 59, at S-70.
66. See id. at S-73. In the case where pollution is associated with an input in the production
process, Parry finds that the optimal tax as a fraction of marginal environmental damages is
slightly higher. See id. at S-76. The tax to damages ratio rises with increased substitutability
between factors of production. See id. The reason is that the ability to substitute factors miti-
gates the rise in the price of the input that is associated with pollution. See DON FULLERTON &
GILBERT METCALF, ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS, SCARCITY RENTS, AND PRE-EXIsTNG Dis-
TORTIONS 18 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6091, 1997) (discussing
the importance of factor substitution).
67. See, e.g., A. Lans Bovenberg & Lawrence H. Goulder, Optimal Environmental Taxation
in the Presence of Other Taxes: General-Equilibrium Analyses, 86 AM. ECON. RV. 985 (1996);
Lawrence H. Goulder, Effects of Carbon Taxes in an Economy with Prior Tax Distortions: An
Intertemporal General Equilibrium Analysis, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MoMr. 271 (1995); Lawrence
H. Goulder et al., Revenue-Raising vs. Other Approaches to Environmental Protection: The Criti-
cal Significance of Pre-Existing Tax Distortions, 28 RAND J. 708 (1997); IAN W.H. PARRY ET
AL., WHEN CAN CARBON ABATEMENT POLICIES INCREASE WELFARE? THE FUNDAMENTAL
ROLE OF DISTORTED FACTOR MARKETS (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper
No. 5967, 1997).
68. Bovenberg & Goulder, supra note 67.
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goods are produced. Households choose labor supply, saving, and
consumption goods, and the model extends over an eighty-year hori-
zon. The government can employ energy and output taxes, corporate
and personal income taxes, property taxes, and sales taxes. The model
is calibrated to 1990 as a benchmark year. In this paper, the authors
consider a carbon tax with revenues used to lower various other taxes.
Table 1 below indicates some of the results obtained. 69
TABLE 1. CARBON TAX RATES
Marginal Optimal Tax Rate
Environmental When Revenues Optimal Tax Rate When Optimal Tax
Damages, i.e., are Used for Revenues are Used to Rate in an
the Pigouvian Lump Sum Grant Reduce Distorting Optimized Tax
Tax Rate to Households Personal Income Tax System
($ per ton) ($ per ton) ($ per ton) ($ per ton)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
25 -19 8 22
50 -10 30 46
75 11 52 70
100 28 73 93
Source: Table 2, Bovenberg and Goulder (1996)
Column (1) represents alternative assumptions about the margi-
nal environmental damages from carbon emissions, in 1990 dollars per
ton. The magnitude of environmental damages is highly uncertain, so
Bovenberg and Goulder consider a wide range of estimates. In a first-
best world where lump-sum taxes are feasible and distortionary taxes
are unnecessary, the Pigouvian tax rate would simply equal the margi-
nal environmental damages. The next column reports the model's cal-
culation for the optimal tax rate, starting from the existing tax
structure and levying a carbon tax, with the proceeds returned lump
sum to households. For low levels of marginal environmental dam-
ages, these tax rates are negative. This result indicates that, given the
sub-optimal nature of the tax system, welfare would be raised by sub-
sidizing pollution. Only when marginal environmental damages ex-
ceed $50 does the tax rate turn positive.
Negative tax rates provide higher welfare than positive tax rates
in this case for two reasons. First, "lump sum rebate" means that any
revenue from a positive tax is not used to reduce other distorting
taxes, and that when the tax on pollution turns negative, the "lump
69. See id. at 992 tbl.2.
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sum rebate" becomes a lump sum tax. Second, the subsidy to pollu-
tion reduces the cost of production and therefore acts indirectly as a
subsidy to labor and capital that are in sub-optimal quantities due to
the pre-existing tax system. The first point is important because a pol-
lution subsidy financed by a lump-sum tax effectively allows the use of
a lump-sum tax to reduce pre-existing distortions. Given a low level
of marginal environmental damages, this subsidy is welfare enhancing.
As damages rise, the tax rate in column (2) rises, but it is never more
than 28% of the marginal environmental damages.
Column (3) demonstrates that the optimal environmental tax is
substantially higher when the proceeds are used to replace a distorting
tax. Now the optimal tax rate is positive at all levels of marginal envi-
ronmental damages. 70 Moreover, the ratio of the tax rate to marginal
environmental damages for realistic damages is consistent with Parry's
estimates.71
The last column reports the optimal environmental tax rate in an
economy where the tax system is chosen optimally in all respects.
Given that distortions are minimized, then the social cost of raising a
dollar is minimized, and the optimal tax rates approach the marginal
environmental damages.72
Bovenberg and Goulder's experiment is similar in spirit to
Parry's. They increase environmental quality with the carbon tax in a
revenue-neutral experiment, starting from zero environmental taxes
and no environmental regulation.73 This type of experiment is proba-
bly appropriate in the case of carbon emissions, but it still differs from
Tullock and Terkla's experiment in that it assumes no pre-existing en-
vironmental regulations.
In a recent paper, Parry considers environmental regulations and
their welfare effects. 74 His point can be demonstrated using our two
figures. If the starting point is no environmental controls, in Figure 1,
then firms pollute to Z0 (where marginal benefits equal private margi-
nal cost of pollution). A restriction in the quantity of pollution to Z',
either through quotas or tradeable permits, can provide area B as an
environmental welfare gain. Those controls also raise the cost of pro-
duction, however, so they raise the price of consumption goods Pc and
70. The comparison of results in columns (2) and (3) provide numerical support for Goul-
der's weak form of the double-dividend hypothesis. See Goulder, supra note 41, at 159.
71. See Parry, supra note 59, at S-73.
72. See Bovenberg & van der Ploeg, supra note 33, at 361.
73. Pre-existing energy taxes in their model act indirectly as environmental taxes to the
extent that they discourage the use of coal in production.
74. See Parry, supra note 4.
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thus lower the real net wage in Figure 2. With any slope to the labor
supply curve, then labor falls (from L' to L'). For reasonable parame-
ter values, the extra cost from labor tax distortions (area D) is larger
than the environmental gain (area B). We return to this point below.
We began this discussion by raising two questions. First, what is
the starting point for any reform intended to provide a double-divi-
dend? Second, what is the reform under consideration? The earliest
reform envisioned was both environmentally neutral and revenue-
neutral. 75 By positing a shift from existing CAC regulations to a sys-
tem of environmental taxes (no first dividend), this reform ensures no
increase in excess burden caused by distortions of production deci-
sions. The revenues from the emissions taxes could then be used to
lower other distorting taxes, thereby providing only the second divi-
dend of environmental policy. Later papers abandoned the environ-
mental-neutrality assumption and focused on the revenue potential of
environniental taxes.76 In the process, they often ignored the excess
burden that arises from distorting production decisions in the effort to
improve environmental quality.77
The discussion in this section has emphasized the concern with
revenue in the double-dividend literature. In the next section, we
show that this focus on revenue is misplaced.
VI. REVENUE AND RENTS
All of the papers discussed in the last three sections consider a
new environmental tax with the revenues used to lower other dis-
torting taxes. In a recent paper, we consider a number of other envi-
ronmental policies in a general equilibrium model similar to the one
employed by Bovenberg and de Mooij. 7 8 Two goods are produced,
one of which is associated with pollution. In the simplest version of
the model, pollution occurs in the consumption of the good, and both
goods are made with one factor of production (labor). The initial
equilibrium has a tax on labor income to finance government spend-
ing, and it has no environmental controls. We then restrict the pro-
duction of the polluting good and measure the welfare impact. Like
Bovenberg and de Mooij, we find that a restriction in production will
affect labor supply if it reduces the real net wage. Welfare falls if la-
75. See Tilock, supra note 5; Terkla, supra note 13.
76. See, e.g., Lee & Misiolek, supra note 24.
77. As pointed out by Bovenberg & de Mooij, supra note 2.
78. See FULLERTON & METCALF, supra note 66.
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bor supply falls. Unlike Bovenberg and de Mooij, we start from a
position with no controls on pollution, so we find a second welfare
effect from the direct impact of the newly introduced restriction on
pollution. That is, reductions in pollution raise welfare. In terms of
Figure 1, if the private marginal cost of pollution is P, then firms set
pollution to Z0 . Any reduction in pollution from Z0 then raises wel-
fare, but any reduction in labor supply reduces welfare. The net im-
pact depends on the relative sizes of these two effects.
Consider a restriction in the form of a pollution tax. The tax
raises the private marginal cost of pollution and thus induces the firm
to cut back its pollution. We show that if the environmental tax reve-
nue is used to lower the labor income tax, then the real net wage is
unaffected by the tax reform. The increase in the nominal wage (due
to the reduction in taxation of wage income) is exactly offset by the
increase in the price of consumption goods (due to the environmental
tax). Using the same separability assumptions as in most of the rest of
the literature, we show that labor supply is unaffected.79 Thus, the
only welfare impact of the policy is the reduction in pollution, and
welfare unambiguously rises. Note, however, that this experiment
yields no "double-dividend" in any sense. The increase in the net
wage due to the reduction in the wage tax is exactly offset by an in-
crease in prices due to the environmental levy.
An alternative policy to reduce pollution would simply be to re-
strict pollution to some amount less than Z0 . This experiment and its
results corresponds to the second paper by Parry,80 but our interpreta-
tion emphasizes the role of scarcity rents. If firms in Figure 1 can emit
no more than Z" of pollution, they will have to rearrange production
somehow. The incremental value of the one more unit of pollution
will equal P', and a firm would be willing to pay any amount up to P'
to pollute one more unit of pollution beyond Z'. Since P' exceeds Po,
the private marginal cost of pollution, pollution has now become more
valuable and the firm is earning scarcity rents for the right to pollute
Z'. The value of the scarcity rents equals (P' - Po) times Z', which is
area A. Even though firms are still competitive, these scarcity rents
are profits from the higher product price. The price is not bid down
79. When Bovenberg and de Mooij start with a pre-existing pollution tax, an increase in
that pollution tax rate reduces the tax base. This effect requires a slightly higher labor tax rate,
which reduces the real net wage. Thus their increase in the pollution tax decreases labor supply.
Starting from a pollution tax rate of zero, however, our small increase has no "tax base effect"
and thus no labor supply effect.
80. Parry, supra note 4.
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because entry is limited: new competitors must buy expensive permits
or expensive new abatement technology. The rents go to initial per-
mit recipients, or to any firm with grandfathered rights to use some
old technology.
If the government imposes a 100% tax on the firm's profits, and
uses the revenue to reduce the labor tax, then the result is exactly
equivalent to the previous policy of the pollution tax.81 The 100% tax
on the scarcity rents arising from the restriction on pollution provides
the same revenue as would be collected from the pollution tax. Thus,
the decrease in the net wage from the reduction in the labor income
tax is again exactly offset by the increase in product price, and the
reform increases welfare only by reducing pollution.
Economists have long understood that price and quantity strate-
gies are equivalent in a world with perfect information. 82 Our point
about the quantity approach (restrictions on emissions) is that ithigh-
lights the important role played by scarcity rents. If the government
does not tax away the privately held scarcity rents, the real net wage
and labor supply will fall. The real wage falls because product prices
rise following the restriction on pollution emissions, with no offsetting
decrease in the tax on labor income. The nominal wage is unaffected,
but the real wage falls as prices rise. The consequent fall in labor sup-
ply has a first-order effect on excess burden (area D in Figure 2), so
overall welfare may either rise or fall. The benefits of the restriction
(reduced pollution) are offset by costs (an increase in labor market
distortions). Indeed, numerical calculations with reasonable parame-
ter values indicate that the costs exceed the benefits-even from the
first small restriction on pollution.
While our focus has shifted from revenue to rents, the story
above suggests that revenue is still the determinate factor to be able to
cut the labor tax and offset the effect of prices on the real net wage.
We next show that revenue is really not even relevant. Consider a
policy where the consumption of non-polluting goods is subsidized by
the government, with the cost paid by increasing the tax on labor in-
come. Regardless of whether it is difficult to implement, we show that
this policy produces the same outcome as either the policy of levying a
tax on the polluting good or the policy of restricting emissions with all
scarcity rents taxed away by the government. Because the "clean"
81. Alternatively, the government could sell the permits rather than give them away.
82. The equivalence breaks down in the presence of uncertainty. See, e.g., Robert N.
Stavins, Correlated Uncertainty and Policy Instrument Choice, 30 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 218
(1996); Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REv. ECON. STUD. 477 (1974).
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good becomes less expensive than the "dirty" good, consumers reduce
their consumption of the, dirty good. While the nominal net wage is
reduced by the increase in tax on labor income, this effect is offset by
a decrease in the price of consumer goods (due to the subsidy on the
clean good). As with the pollution tax example, the two effects ex-
actly cancel. The real net wage-and hence labor supply-is
unaffected.
Because a tax on the polluting good and a subsidy to consump-
tion of non-polluting goods have diametrically opposed revenue con-
sequences, something else must be at work that leads these two
policies to the same welfare effects. What they have in common is
that neither policy leaves scarcity rents in private hands.83
Once the focus is turned from revenues to rents, a number of
other policies become possible that have the same-positive benefits of
reduced pollution without exacerbating pre-existing distortions. For
example, consider the following modification of the model described
above. Rather than assuming that pollution is associated with con-
sumption of a good, assume that it is associated with some input to
production. 84 Production now is assumed to depend on multiple fac-
tors, where one of these factors is linked to pollution. A technology
restriction could be implemented that requires a reduction for all
firms in the ratio of pollution-linked ("dirty") inputs to other
("clean") inputs. We show that, for small restrictions, such a policy
has insignificant impact on costs for these firms and hence does not
increase product prices. Thus the policy reduces pollution without ex-
acerbating the pre-existing wage distortion.85
The intuition for the lack of a cost effect is quite simple. The
restriction requiring a reduction in the ratio of dirty to clean inputs
makes the dirty input more valuable to the firm (moving up its margi-
83. Neither the tax nor the subsidy creates scarcity rents. Restrictions on output (e.g.,
tradeable permits) do create rents, but do not leave them in private hands if the government
taxes the rents away (or sells the permits at a market price).
84. In fact, one can view pollution itself as an input in the production process.
85. In our model, because of competition and constant returns to scale, all firms have access
to the same production technology. Thus all firms have the same abatement cost function, and
the same restriction can apply to all of them. When abatement costs differ, and when regulators
have imperfect information about these differences, then imperfect CAC policies can be six to
ten times as expensive as the minimum abatement cost made possible by incentive-based policies
like taxes or permits. See the review in Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental
Economics: A Survey, 30 J. ECON. LrTERATURE 675 (1992). Thus, heterogeneity can certainly
raise the cost of CAC policies, but we abstract from such excess costs here in order to make an
entirely different point: all else equal, the cost of permits or CAC quantity restrictions that
create scarcity rents may exceed the cost of a CAC technology restriction that does not create
rents.
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nal benefit curve) while simultaneously making the clean input less
valuable (moving down its marginal benefit curve). In effect, the firm
earns scarcity rents on the polluting factor of production while it in-
curs losses on the clean factor. The firm is cross-subsidizing produc-
tion, with an implicit tax on the dirty input used to pay for an implicit
subsidy to the clean factor of production. The cross-subsidization
means that no net rents are being earned by the firm, while pollution
is reduced.
This argument-like that of many of the papers in this litera-
ture-holds for small changes in pollution policy only. For larger
changes, the technology restriction just gets the "substitution effect"
defined above, because it reduces pollution per unit of output. Thus
this policy alone may not minimize the cost of large cuts in pollution.
To achieve the "output effect," however, the technology restriction
could be combined with a tax on output of the polluting good. 86 In
any case, to evaluate the impact of large policy changes, one must turn
to numerical simulation analyses along the lines of those undertaken
by Goulder and various co-authors.87
The important point about the technology restriction for present
purposes is that these firms cannot make net profits, in equilibrium, or
else competitors would enter and bid those profits away. Entrants
would only be subject to the same technology restrictions on the ratio
of dirty inputs to clean inputs. In contrast, scarcity rents arise in the
earlier type of CAC restriction because competitors cannot enter the
industry on the same terms as existing firms who are handed initial
allocations of permits or grandfathered rights to use old technology.
The importance of rents in environmental policymaking has long
been understood, but for reasons different than those we identify
here. James M. Buchanan and Tullock argued that industry would
prefer regulation in the form of direct controls rather than pollution
taxes because the former would create scarcity rents by erecting a bar-
rier to entry.88 Their paper provided a positive explanation for the
type of environmental controls that were popular in the 1960s and
1970s, and it emphasized the distributional implications of different
policies. Michael T. Maloney and Robert E. McCormick provided
86. See KAREN PALMER & MARGARET WALLS, UPSTREAM POLLUTION, DOWNSTREAM
WASTE DISPOSAL, AND THE DESIGN OF COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES (Resources
for the Future Working Paper No. 97-51, 1997).
87. See sources cited supra note 67.
88. See James M. Buchanan & Gordon Thllock, Polluters' Profits and Political Response:
Direct Controls Versus Taxes, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 139 (1975).
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empirical support for this argument, using stock market event analy-
ses of the textile and smelting industries.8 9 In both industries, they
found evidence of abnormally high stock returns following the in-
crease in environmental regulation. 90 Neither Buchanan and Tullock
nor Maloney and McCormick considered the efficiency impact of the
regulations, but simply view the regulations as a device that redistrib-
utes wealth by creating scarcity rents. In contrast, we have shown that
scarcity rents also have efficiency implications by raising the cost of
output.
In fact, the pollution restriction creates scarcity rents equal to
area A in Figure 1, and it redistributes that amount from consumers
who pay higher product prices to private parties who receive the rights
to pollute (i.e., the permits). This policy is thus equivalent to a tax on
pollution that raises product prices where the revenue is rebated
lump-sum to particular private parties (or where the revenue is used
to reduce a lump-sum tax on some fixed factor of production). In all
of these cases, the government essentially enacted a lump-sum trans-
fer to some private party rather than using the revenue to reduce dis-
torting taxes.91
In this section we have shown that the focus in the double-divi-
dend literature on revenue is misplaced. Environmental policies that
raise revenue used to reduce other distorting taxes have effects that
can be exactly mimicked by policies that lose revenue (subsidies to
abatement and to clean consumption) or that do not raise any revenue
at all (technology restrictions). Rather than focus on revenues, we
argue that the appropriate focus is on the creation of privately-held
scarcity rents. Finally, we show that not all CAC regulations are
equivalent. Regulations that effectively restrict output or otherwise
create entry barriers (e.g., distinctions between new and old capital
that arise from grandfathering provisions) will create scarcity rents
and raise product prices, while technology-based regulations can be
designed that avoid creating scarcity rents. In the latter case, environ-
89. Michael T. Maloney & Robert E. McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental
Quality Regulation, 25 J.L. & ECON. 99 (1982). For the textile industry, cotton-dust standards
were formulated beginning in 1974. See id. at 110. These standards were significantly more
stringent than previous standards and could discourage entry into the industry. See id. The
nonferrous metal smelting industry was affected by a Supreme Court decision that required the
Environmental Protection Agency to "prevent significant deterioration" ("PSD") of air quality
under the mandate of the 1970 Clean Air Act. See Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973). The
PSD ruling effectively made entry into this industry very difficult. See Maloney & McCormick,
supra, at 117-21.
90. See Maloney & McCormick, supra note 89, at 122-23.
91. See sources cited supra note 67.
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mental protection can be purchased without the additional cost of ex-
acerbating distortions from the existing tax system.92
VII. CONCLUSION
Using environmental taxes to reduce the reliance on other dis-
torting taxes has become a very popular idea. The double-dividend
hypothesis-the idea that environmental taxes can both improve the
environment and reduce excess burden-is the intellectual foundation
for this type of tax reform. We began our paper by noting that the
evaluation of this hypothesis has often been confused because writers
have not fully specified the economic environment in which the re-
form is being considered and have not fully specified the reform itself.
Thus we have organized our survey around the following two ques-
tions: What environmental policies are in place prior to the environ-
mental reform? What is the complete reform being proposed?
We have made four points in this paper. First, the validity of the
double-dividend hypothesis cannot be settled as a general matter.
Under certain circumstances, a shift to environmental taxes may im-
prove the environment and reduce the overall burden of the tax sys-
tem. In other circumstances, such a shift may increase the burden of
the tax system. Each reform must be evaluated on its own merits.
Second, the emphasis in the literature on the importance of revenue is
misplaced. We have demonstrated that three types of policies can
have equivalent impacts on the environment and on labor supply.
One of these policies raises revenue from the environmental compo-
nent of the reform, another loses revenue, and a third has no revenue
associated with it. Third, the creation of scarcity rents is relevant.
Policies that create scarcity rents and leave those rents in private
hands will exacerbate pre-existing distortions to a greater extent than
do policies that do not create privately-held scarcity rents. Policies
that create privately-held scarcity rents raise costs of production be-
yond what is necessary to mitigate environmental problems. Finally,
we have shown that different regulatory approaches are available and
that not all regulations create scarcity rents. Thus, policymakers have
available to them more policy options than is suggested by the previ-
92. This point is not an argument against market-based approaches and in favor of regula-
tion. Many economists feel that properly functioning markets are a good approach to dealing
with environmental problems. They may find efficiency gains, for example, from the abatement-
cost-minimizing features of the tradeable permits program established by the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990. We simply add consideration of efficiency losses from exacerbating labor
tax distortions when the permits are given away rather than sold.
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ous literature that focuses only on revenue. Environmental levies may
be desirable on a number of other grounds such as compliance, ad-
ministration, or political viability. On the other hand, these non-eco-
nomic considerations may make regulation the preferred policy
response. If so, an important additional consideration is whether the
regulatory response in question creates privately-held scarcity rents.
